Representation and Reality

Preface Introduction Chapter 1 Meaning and Mentalism Fodor and Chomsky Three Reasons Why Mentalism Can't Be Right 1 Meaning Is Holistic 2 Meaning Is in Part a Normative Notion 3 Our Concepts Depend on Our Physical and Social Environment in a Way That Evolution (Which Was Com ... Connections between 1, 2, and 3 Chapter 2 Meaning, Other People, and the World The Division of Linguistic Labor Elms, Beeches, and Searle The Contribution of the Environment An Indexical Component Other Natural Kinds Reference and Theory Change Meaning and "Mental Representation" Chapter 3 Fodor and Block on "Narrow Content" Narrow Content as a "Function of Observable Properties" "Narrow Content" and "Conceptual Role" Concluding Remarks Chapter 4 Are There Such Things as Reference and Truth? Why "Folk Psychology" and Not "Folk Logic"? Disquotation, Anyone? The "Semantical Conception" of Truth Disquotation as Disappearance Chapter 5 Why Functionalism Didn't Work Sociofunctionalism What "In Principle" Means Here The Single-Computational-State Version of Functionalism Equivalence Surveying Rationality Chapter 6 Other Forms of Functionalism David Lewis and I Lewis's Theory Further Examined Conclusion Chapter 7 A Sketch of an Alternative Picture Objectivity and Conceptual Relativity Internal Realism as an Alternative Picture My Present Diagnosis of the "Functionalism" Issue Appendix Notes Author Index