Safeguards Techniques and Equipment

The IAEA has the task of providing continuing assurance to the international community that States that have entered into safeguards agreements with the IAEA are meeting their obligations. This requires, in particular, that any diversion of safeguarded nuclear material from civil use to a proscribed purpose would be detected. To this end, the IAEA must be able to verify the correctness and completeness of the statements it receives from States concerning the nuclear materials included in the State's safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Moreover, the IAEA must be able to confirm that there is no undeclared nuclear material and activity present in the State. Inspectors use equipment to make independent measurements to verify quantitatively the amounts of nuclear material presented in the State's accounts. This equipment can measure attributes of the items under control or can measure the amount of nuclear material with a relative uncertainty in the range of 1-10. Containment and surveillance (C/S) techniques are applied to reduce the safeguards inspection effort (e.g. by limiting the frequency of accountancy verification) and also to give assurance that nuclear material follows predetermined routes, that the integrity of its containment remains unimpaired, and that the material is accounted for at the correct measurement points. A variety of techniques are used, primarily optical surveillance and sealing. The present booklet provides an overview of the methods and technologies used by the IAEA inspectors in performing the verification activities.